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Abstract
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our ex-
perimental design allows separating the e¤ects of risk and social preferences
behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind
than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to
maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insur-
ance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results
contrast the Utilitarians claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin pref-
erences necessarily imply in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1 Introduction
Our experiment explores the relationship between social preferences and Rawlsdif-
ference principle that economists have formalized by maximin preferences. In his
book "A Theory of Justice" (1971) the philosopher John Rawls coined the term "veil
of ignorance" for the following thought experiment: Behind the veil of ignorance,
nobody knows which future position in society he (as well as other individuals) will
be assigned when deciding how to distribute resources across di¤erent positions. Ac-
cording to Rawls society would agree behind the veil of ignorance that the di¤erence
principle should constitute the basis of the social contract. The di¤erence princi-
ple states that society should maximize the utility of the individual that is worst
o¤. Utilitarians have asserted that being in favor of the di¤erence principle is only
strictly optimal for innitely risk averse individuals and thus, have dismissed the
di¤erence principle and maximin preferences as unrealistic. However, the Utilitar-
ians argument assumes that everybody is only interested in his own material payo¤.
In contrast, theories on social preferences assume that people are self-interested to
some degree, but also care about (the payo¤s of) others.1 In this paper, we ar-
gue that if people have social preferences, they could be in favor of an egalitarian
distribution even if they are risk neutral.
Our experiment implements the veil of ignorance in the laboratory2 and tests
whether decisions behind the veil of ignorance are only driven by risk attitudes or
also by social preferences. Assume decisions behind the veil of ignorance reect
(impartial) social preferences for equality in addition to risk aversion. Then the
di¤erence principle is consistent with any degree of risk aversion as long as social
preferences for equality are su¢ ciently strong to make individuals opt for a com-
pletely equal distribution.
Implementing the veil of ignorance we measure social preferences that are free
of self-interest in a narrow sense ("impartial social preferences"). In other words,
impartial social preferences are an individuals preferences over distributions of pay-
1Focusing on the distribution of payo¤s the notion of social preferences we use is most closely
related to Fehr and Schmidts (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels(2000) models of inequity aversion.
For a recent survey on the literature on social preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
2With any implementation of the veil of ignorance in the laboratory subjects will know much
more than in Rawls original position, e.g. they will know their sex and ability. Still, the im-
plementation of the veil of ignorance is perfect with respect to subjects positions and implied
payo¤s. Hence, in our experimental setup we can measure subjectsrisk attitudes and potential
social preferences behind the veil of ignorance and this is what we aim at.
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o¤s to himself and his reference group when favoring oneself over the others is not
possible. Information on peoples impartial social preferences can be useful for many
aspects of policy design, e.g. the design of tax, social security or public health in-
surance systems. Imagine, as an example for eliciting social preferences, a survey in
which you ask a poor person whether he is in favor of more redistribution. If you
get the answer yesyou cannot interpret it unambiguously: does this person prefer
more redistribution because he is likely to prot from it? Or does this person have
an innate preference for a more equal society? In contrast, if you had asked this per-
son behind the veil of ignorance and had received the (now impartial) answer yes
you would have known that the latter is true (or that this person is risk averse).
Our experiment uses a three treatment design: the dictator game treatment is a
dictator game with a 50 % e¢ ciency loss. A dictator game is a two player game in
which the rst player, the dictator, proposes a split of a given pie. The second player,
the receiver, is passive. Both players are paid according to the dictators proposal.3
Our specic variant of the dictator game is characterized by an e¢ ciency loss of 50
% for units that are transferred from the dictator to the receiver. Consequently,
a trade o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency4 arises: a more equal allocation can
only be achieved by transferring more which in turn induces a larger e¢ ciency loss.
Our second treatment, the veil of ignorance treatment, is characterized by the same
e¢ ciency loss, but adds role uncertainty to implement the veil of ignorance: each
participant decides how many units of a 12 unit pie the dictator will give away to the
receiver before he is assigned the role of dictator or receiver with equal probability.
Finally, each participant will be paid according to his own choice how many units the
dictator will transfer to the receiver in the role he has been assigned, i.e. will earn
either the dictators or the receivers payo¤. Using role uncertainty to implement
the veil of ignorance removes the possibility to favor oneself over the other player
and, at the same time, introduces risk. The risk treatment serves as a control
treatment to isolate a subjects risk preferences. It has the same e¢ ciency loss and
role uncertainty as the veil of ignorance treatment, but it is a one person game. In
the risk treatment each participant decides how to allocate the pie across the states
of being dictator or being receiver and is randomly assigned the position of either
dictator or receiver afterwards. However, the position not assigned to the decision
maker is not lled in by a second person. The money assigned to the empty position
3In this variant, the dictator game was rst introduced by Forsythe et al. (1994).
4In this paper, we dene a more e¢ cient allocation to be an allocation with a higher sum of
payo¤s of both players (Kaldor-Hicks e¢ ciency).
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is not paid out. The e¢ ciency loss enables us to tell apart subjects with di¤erent
degrees of risk aversion. In terms of risk, the decision situation in the risk and the
veil of ignorance treatment is identical, but impartial social preferences can only be
an additional motive in the two person veil of ignorance treatment.
By comparing decisions in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment we can
test our hypothesis that the di¤erence principle can be derived from any degree
of risk aversion as long as impartial social preferences for equality are su¢ ciently
strong. If decisions in these two treatments dont di¤er signicantly only risk aver-
sion determines behavior behind the veil of ignorance. Hence, the claim that the
di¤erence principle can only be derived from innite risk aversion is correct. If, in
contrast, di¤erences between the two treatments are signicant and impartial social
preferences in the veil of ignorance treatment reect equality concerns, then the
di¤erence principle is compatible with any degree of risk aversion if impartial social
preferences for equality are su¢ ciently strong.
We nd that subjects transfer signicantly more in the veil of ignorance than
in the dictator game treatment. Still, in the veil of ignorance treatment only a
minority of subjects opts for the di¤erence principle. In all three treatments we
observe striking gender di¤erences: women are more risk averse and have a stronger
concern for equality than men. For men behavior does not di¤er signicantly in the
risk and the veil of ignorance treatment, i.e. for the vast majority of male subjects
the veil of ignorance introduces only risk. In contrast, for women, impartial social
preferences for equality are a second signicant motivation besides risk in the veil
of ignorance treatment. Our results for women imply that the di¤erence principle
can also be derived from impartial social preferences for equality and thus does not
necessarily imply innite risk aversion.
Some other economic experiments implement the veil of ignorance. Johannesson
and Gerdtham (1995), Beckman et al. (2002), Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson and
Daruvala (2002), and Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003) basically let
subjects who do not yet know the place they (or their imaginary grandchildren)
will occupy in a given society choose between societies that di¤er with respect to
mean and distribution of income. Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2004) ask
subjects to vote in favor of either a lump-sum or a progressive tax regime before
they are randomly assigned a pre-tax payo¤. To be able to interpret the observed
behavior in terms of impartial social preferences, all mentioned experiments have to
assume that subjects are risk neutral. Otherwise, the observed behavior can only
be interpreted as the result of either risk aversion or impartial social preferences.
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The new contribution of our experiment is that we are able to separate the e¤ects
of risk aversion and impartial social preferences in a veil of ignorance setting.5
Only few further experiments in economics have elicited impartial social prefer-
ences without referring to the veil of ignorance. In Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
one of the decision makers tasks is to choose among three di¤erent allocations of
payo¤s across himself and two further subjects that represent an e¢ ciency-equality
trade o¤. Since the decision makers payo¤ is constant across all three allocations,
the experimental design controls for self-interest. A constant payo¤ for the decision
maker also implies that his choice has no monetary consequences for himself. In
contrast, one crucial aspect of the veil of ignorance, our object of investigation, is
that both the decision maker and his reference group are a¤ected by choices made
behind the veil of ignorance.6
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The details of the experi-
mental design and implementation are explained in section 2. Section 3 presents the
hypotheses to be tested and links them to the experimental design. Results are pro-
vided in section 4 that also elaborates on the striking di¤erences in the behavior of
male and female subjects. In the last section, we conclude. The appendix contains
instructions, control questions and the experimental data.
2 Experimental Design and Procedure
2.1 The three treatments
The experimental design is based on a dictator game. Since the receiver is purely
passive, the dictator game is one of the simplest ways to elicit the dictators social
preferences that do not interfere with any strategic considerations. In our experi-
ment, dictators have to decide how to split a 12 unit pie.
We use a three treatment design. The dictator game treatment is a standard
5The veil of ignorance has also been the subject of experimental inquiries in other disciplines
such that political sciences and psychology (Brickman, 1977; Curtis, 1979; Frohlich, Oppenheimer
and Eavey, 1987; Bond and Park, 1991; Mitchell et al., 1993).
6Being a¤ected by ones own choice might inuence behavior: First, the decision maker has
monetary incentives to reveal his true preferences. Second, imagine a decision maker who prefers
a very e¢ cient, but highly unequal allocation. In a setup with a constant payo¤ for the decision
maker, choosing the unequal allocation corresponds to "punishing" some of the other subjects
while being on the safe side himself. In contrast, in our experiment, the decision maker himself
risks getting a very low payo¤ when choosing an unequal allocation.
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dictator game with one additional feature, an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % for units trans-
ferred from the dictator to the receiver. The e¢ ciency loss introduces a trade-o¤
between equality and e¢ ciency and can be interpreted as a deadweight loss that
arises as the cost of redistribution. We choose an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % because it
is easy to calculate for the experimental subjects and makes our results compara-
ble to those obtained in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001). Since the dictator can only transfer integer units, the following allocations
are possible results of the game:
Table 1: Possible allocations
dictator 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
receiver 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
There are two focal points among these allocations: the allocation (12,0) repre-
sents the most e¢ cient one (and, at the same time, the one a selsh dictator would
choose). An individual with a very strong concern for equality would choose allo-
cation (4,4). Transferring more than necessary to achieve the equal split allocation
(4,4) is hard to rationalize: the resulting allocations impose an enormous e¢ ciency
loss and add inequality. The dictator game treatment serves as benchmark, ensures
comparability with related studies and measures social preferences.
The veil of ignorance treatment implements the veil of ignorance by introducing
role uncertainty. It is a dictator game with the same 50 % e¢ ciency loss as the
dictator game treatment and additional role uncertainty. Role uncertainty means
that rst every subject decides how many units the dictator will transfer. After
this transfer decision roles (dictator and receiver) are randomly assigned and pairs
consisting of one dictator and one receiver matched. Finally, a subject that has
been assigned the receiver (dictator) role will be paid the receivers (dictators)
payo¤ according to his own decision how many units the dictator will transfer to
the receiver. For example, imagine a subject that has rst decided that the dictator
will transfer 4 units. If this subject then gets assigned the receiver role he will receive
a payo¤ of 1
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4 = 2, his matched subject in the dictator role will receive 12 4 = 8
units. If this subjects gets assigned the dictator role he will receive a payo¤ of 8
units, his matched subject in the receiver role will receive 2 units. It is possible
that every subjects decision is implemented as the dictators choice (independent
of whether the decision-maker has been assigned the role of dictator or receiver)
because each subject also serves as a dummy player in another subjects decision.
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Procedural details of our matching protocol are provided below.
Implementing the veil of ignorance as described above induces risk and poten-
tially impartial social preferences. To test whether the veil of ignorance is only a
concept about risk we have to be able to isolate potential impartial social preferences
from risk considerations that jointly determine subjectsdecisions behind the veil of
ignorance.
The risk treatment serves exactly this purpose. It di¤ers from the veil of ig-
norance treatment in just one respect. It is a one person game and consequently,
basically a lottery decision: rst, each subject decides how to allocate the pie across
the states of being dictator or being receiver. After that decision each subject is
randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver with equal probability. In contrast
to the veil of ignorance treatment, there is no second subject who lls in the role
that has not been assigned to the decision-maker. For example, imagine a subject
that has rst decided that the dictator will transfer 4 units. If this subject then gets
assigned the receiver role it will receive a payo¤of 1
2
4 = 2, 12 4 = 8 units will not
be paid out. If this subjects gets assigned the dictator role it will receive a payo¤ of
8 units, 4 units will not be paid out. Since there is no second subject who is a¤ected
by the decision makers choice, the decisions in the risk treatment simply reect the
individual degree of risk aversion and cannot be inuenced by social preferences.
Table 2 summarizes the three treatments.
Table 2: The three treatment design
treatment characteristics what is measured?
e¢ ciency role number of
loss uncertainty players
dictator game yes no 2 social preferences
veil of ignorance yes yes 2 impartial social
preferences with risk
risk yes yes 1 risk attitude
There are two reasons that make the e¢ ciency loss an essential feature of our
experimental design: First, in the risk treatment the e¢ ciency loss introduces a cost
of insurance which allows telling apart risk neutral and risk averse subjects as well
as risk averse subjects with di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. With any e¢ ciency
loss, risk neutral subjects who maximize their expected payo¤ strictly prefer the
(12,0) allocation over all other allocations. For each risk averse subject, we get an
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approximate measure of individual risk aversion: the more risk averse a subject is
the more units 0 < x < 8 he will transfer. Very strongly risk averse subjects transfer
8 units which results in the (4,4) allocation that provides full insurance. Without the
e¢ ciency loss, all possible allocations would have an expected payo¤ of 6 and every
risk averse subject would choose the (6,6) allocation that provides full insurance at
no cost. Risk neutral subjects would be indi¤erent between all possible allocations
and thus might also choose the (6,6) allocation.
Second, to test whether the di¤erence principle can also be derived from impartial
social preferences for equal outcomes we have to be able to observe whether less than
innitely risk-averse subjects (i.e. subjects who transfer x < 8 in the risk treatment)
transfer x = 8 in the veil of ignorance treatment. Since the only di¤erence between
the veil of ignorance and the risk treatment is the existence of the second person a
higher transfer in the veil of ignorance treatment is caused by a concern for equality.
With a 50 % e¢ ciency loss, only few subjects will opt for full, but very costly
insurance in the risk treatment. For all but these very strongly risk averse subjects
there is still room for moving towards a more equal allocation in the veil of ignorance
treatment. In contrast, if there was no e¢ ciency loss, all risk averse subjects would
choose the (6,6) allocation in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment irrespective
of whether they are purely selsh or have impartial social preferences for equality.
Only for those risk neutral subjects who would transfer x < 6 in the risk treatment
we could learn whether they have impartial social preferences for equality behind
the veil of ignorance.7
2.2 Sessions
Due to matching requirements each subject participated in two of the three treat-
ments: in the risk treatment and in one of the two two-player treatments, either the
dictator game or the veil of ignorance treatment. At each time of the experiment
half of the subjects played the risk treatment. These subjects were matched with
the other half of subjects who played one of the two two-player treatments in the
7The experimental design cannot distinguish between subjects who are risk neutral and those
who are risk loving. Both will choose the (12,0) allocation. This might be a aw as, ceteris paribus,
a more risk loving individual will let the dictator transfer less in the veil of ignorance treatment, a
decision that we will interpret to reect a preference for e¢ ciency. To avoid this problem we could
have run a second version of the risk treatment with an e¢ ciency gain instead of loss to explicitly
measure potential risk loving. We decided against this further treatment because we do not expect
many subjects to be risk loving.
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same room at the same time. This matching across treatments has two advantages:
rst, not only in the risk but also in the veil of ignorance and the dictator game
treatment every subjects decision is in fact implemented (and every subject knows
this8). We avoid introducing an additional source of risk in the veil of ignorance
treatment, namely whether ones own decision or the decision of ones matched sub-
ject will be implemented. Second, we maximize the number of observations because
we avoid paying passive players. As a result of the matching, each subject had three
sources of payo¤ at the end of the session: the payo¤ from his own risk decision, a
payo¤ from his own decision in one of the two two-player treatments and a payo¤
from a randomly assigned subjects decision in one of the two two-player treatments.
Subjects were only informed about the last, additional source of payo¤ that they
could not inuence anyway at the end of the experiment.
In total we conducted nine sessions. In ve sessions, all subjects played the risk
and the veil of ignorance treatment, though in di¤erent orders. In the remaining four
sessions, half of the participants rst played the risk and then the veil of ignorance
treatment, while the other half of participants rst played the dictator game and
then the risk treatment. The three treatment orders are depicted in table 3.
Table 3: Treatment orders
rst treatment second treatment number of subjects
risk veil of ignorance 83
veil of ignorance risk 48
dictator game risk 36
Before we pool the data obtained in one specic treatment, but from di¤erent
treatment orders we have to make sure that there are no order e¤ects. For the two
treatment orders of the veil of ignorance treatment we use the MannWhitney test
and for the three treatment orders of the risk treatment we use the Kruskal-Wallis
test to check whether the distributions of transferred units obtained in di¤erent
treatment orders are signicantly di¤erent. Table 4 shows that we can pool all veil
of ignorance and risk treatment data respectively for the whole sample as well as
8We told decision-makers in the dictator game and the veil of ignorance treatment in the
instructions: "only half of the participants present in this room are taking part in the same
experiment as you do. The other half of the participants is playing another experiment whose
payo¤ does not a¤ect you at all. You are assigned a participant from this other half".
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for men and women separately.9 In sum, we collected 131 observations on decisions
in the veil of ignorance treatment, 167 in the risk and 36 in the dictator game
treatment. The complete experimental data are displayed by treatment and sex in
Appendix 6.2.
Table 4: No order e¤ects
veil of ignorance treatment risk treatment
(Mann-Whitney test*) (Kruskal-Wallis test*)
all p=0.627 (131 obs.) p=0.464 (167 obs.)
men p=0.810 (40 obs.) p=0.729 (59 obs.)
women p=0.505 (91 obs.) p=0.816 (108 obs.)
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
2.3 Experimental procedure and subjects
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects
were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took
their decisions in complete anonymity from the other subjects. The random allo-
cation to a cubicle also determined the individual treatment order. Subjects were
handed out the instructions for their rst treatment and answered several comput-
erized control questions that tested their understanding of the decision situation.
Only after providing and explaining the right answers on the computer screen, we
proceeded to the decision stage of the rst treatment. After all subjects had made
their rst decision, we announced that there would be a second and at the same time
last experiment. To avoid income e¤ects we did not give subjects any feedback on
the result of the rst treatment before they were paid at the end of the whole session.
The second treatment followed with the same procedures. We nished each exper-
imental session by asking subjects to answer a questionnaire on their demographic
characteristics, the strategies they had used and their expectations concerning the
behavior and risk attitudes of the other subjects.
A translated version of the instructions and the corresponding control questions
can be found in Appendix 6.1. The experiment was programmed using the ex-
perimental software zTree (Fischbacher, 1999) and conducted at the experimental
9We present test results also by sex as gender di¤erences will be important for the interpretation
of our results.
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laboratory of the SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim, Germany in November
2005. The experiments lasted about one hour and subjects earned about 16 Eu-
ros on average. All 167 subjects10 were university students with a large variety of
subjects. The main characteristics of the subjects are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5: Composition of treatments
dictator game risk veil of ignorance
treatment treatment treatment
number of observations 36 167 131
sex* 19 (F)/17(M) 59(F)/108(M) 40(F)/91(M)
mean age 23.56 23.77 23.82
knowledge in economics** 66.67 % 64.67 % 64.12 %
* F stands for female, M for male
** includes students studying economics or business administration as minor or major
3 Hypotheses
Let us rst briey turn to the growing literature on gender di¤erences in risk at-
titudes and social preferences. Reviewing the vast economic literature on gender
di¤erences in risk preferences Eckel and Grossman (2006) conclude that women are
characterized by a higher degree of risk aversion than men in eld studies, while
the results from laboratory experiments are less consistent. Similarly, Croson and
Gneezys (2004) survey summarizes that there is clear evidence that men are more
risk-taking than women in most tasks and most populations. Camerer (2003, p.64)
summarizes evidence on the e¤ect of gender on social preferences and concludes that
evidence is mixed.11
However the studies that are most closely related to our dictator game and
veil of ignorance treatment indicate that gender di¤erences are likely to matter in
10We admitted only an even number of subjects to the experiment but one subject left during
the course of the experiment. His role was lled by one of the experimenters and the corresponding
observations were deleted.
11Considering dictator games, for example, Eckel and Grossman (1998) nd that women on
average donate twice as much as men in a standard dictator game. Similarly, Dufwenberg and
Muren (2005) present results of a dictator game in which signicantly fewer men than women give
non-zero amounts. In contrast, Bolton and Katok (1995) nd no systematic gender di¤erences in
a standard dictator game.
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our experimental setup. In Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) subjects play dictator
games with di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency losses. They nd that when it is relatively
expensive to give, women are more generous than men. As the price of giving
decreases, men begin to give more than women. With our 50 % e¢ ciency loss,
women are signicantly more generous than men. The following two studies are,
to some extent, related to our veil of ignorance treatment: they have an impartial
decision maker as we do, but, in contrast to our study, the decision makers payo¤
is xed and independent of his own choice. Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2006) replicate
Engelmann and Strobels (2004) experiment and nd that women choose the most
egalitarian allocation signicantly more often than men. Dickinson and Tiefenthaler
(2002) play an experiment with a disinterested third-party decision maker in which
women are signicantly more likely to choose an allocation resulting in equal payo¤s
while men are more likely to choose the most e¢ cient allocation.
To check for the existence of gender di¤erences in our experimental setup we
formulate Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1
Women and men do not behave signicantly di¤erent in any of our treatments.
If we should reject hypothesis 1 gender di¤erences in risk attitudes and social
preferences are likely to a¤ect all further results on di¤erences between treatments.
Consequently, we should then analyze the following hypotheses not only for both
sexes jointly, but also for men and women separately.
Exploiting our three treatment design we can rst compare transfers in the dic-
tator game and the veil of ignorance treatment that have the same trade o¤between
equality and e¢ ciency.
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Hypothesis 2
There is no signicant di¤erence between social preferences and impartial social
preferences with risk that are measured in the dictator game and the veil of ignorance
treatment respectively.
If we should reject hypothesis 2, we will ask next whether the observed di¤erence
can be completely explained by risk aversion: Is the veil of ignorance only a concept
that introduces risk? Or, in contrast, are impartial social preferences an additional
motivation behind the veil of ignorance?
Hypothesis 3
There is no signicant di¤erence between risk preferences and impartial social
preferences with risk that are measured in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment
respectively.
The only di¤erence between the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment is
whether a second person exists who is a¤ected by the decision makers transfer
decision. Since the degree of risk is held constant, the two treatments di¤er only
in whether impartial social preferences can possibly motivate the observed transfer
decisions. If we cannot reject hypothesis 3, the thought experiment of a veil of ig-
norance has correctly been perceived as a concept inducing only risk aversion. The
only way to derive Rawlsdi¤erence principle is to assume innite risk aversion.
In contrast, if hypothesis 3 is rejected, impartial social preferences are a signicant
motivation behind the veil of ignorance. Consequently, the di¤erence principle and
maximin preferences can also be considered the result of impartial social prefer-
ences combined with any degree of risk aversion (assuming that impartial social
preferences induce an increased concern for equality).12
This is investigated by hypothesis 4: given that impartial social preferences
introduce an additional motive, do they induce an increased concern for equality or
for e¢ ciency? To what extent does a veil of ignorance like situation induce maximin
preferences as predicted by Rawls?
12While the term "veil of ignorance" was coined by Rawls, Harsanyi (1953, 1955) already used the
same thought experiment. Harsanyi interprets value judgments made behind the veil of ignorance
to reect choices involving just risk and assumes that agents are risk neutral. Consequently,
he predicts e¢ ciency seeking behavior to prevail behind the veil of ignorance. In terms of our
experiment, Harsanyis argument would be supported if we found that subjects do not transfer
any units in the risk treatment (risk neutrality) and if di¤erences in subjectsbehavior across the
risk and the impartiality treatment were not signicant.
13
Hypothesis 4
In the veil of ignorance treatment subjects behave according to maximin prefer-
ences.
4 Results
4.1 Gender di¤erences
Result 1
In our experiment, women are signicantly more risk averse than men and choose
more equal (and thus less e¢ cient) allocations than men.
In total, we had 108 male (65 %) and 59 female (35 %) subjects. Table 6 displays
average transferred units by sex and treatment as well as test results by treatment
for whether medians and distributions of transferred units di¤er for men and women.
Table 6: Gender di¤erences by treatment
treatment mean men mean women Mann-Whitney Median test*
test*
dictator game 0.76 (17 obs.) 2.37 (19 obs.) p=0.061 p=0.091**
risk 2.72 (108 obs.) 3.69 (59 obs.) p=0.014 p=0.016
veil of ignorance 2.81 (91 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.000 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
**: In the dictator game treatment, the median corresponds to keeping all 12 units. To obtain
a test result we treat observations that equal the median like observations greater instead of
lower than the median as we do in all other Median tests reported.
In sum, we observe strikingly di¤erent transfer behaviors of male and female
subjects: according to Mann-Whitney tests the distributions of units transferred
di¤er signicantly for men and women both in the risk and in the veil of ignorance
treatment. The same is true for medians. In the veil of ignorance treatment, the
absolute di¤erence in means is largest and amounts to 2.2 units with 8 units being
the maximal reasonable transfer amount. Women transfer more and thus are more
concerned about equality while men care more about e¢ ciency. Gender di¤erences
in the risk treatment are smaller in absolute amounts, but strongly signicant: they
indicate that, on average, women are more risk averse than men. Due to the small
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number of observations medians and distributions are only weakly marginally di¤er-
ent in the dictator game treatment. Still, on average male dictators transfer less than
one out of 8 units, female dictators transfer nearly 2.5 units. Furthermore, about
70 % of male dictators keep the whole pie, while only 37 % of women do. Carlsson,
Daruvala and Johansson-Stenman (2005) run two di¤erent treatments to measure
a given individuals risk and inequality aversion in the absence of risk. Similar to
our results, they nd that female subjects are more risk averse and more inequality
averse than men.
In sum, male and female subjects do behave signicantly di¤erent in our ex-
periment. Consequently, we will focus on analyzing the data for men and women
separately. We will also present a joint analysis for the sake of completeness and
to guarantee comparability of our results in the dictator game treatment to other
dictator game studies.13
4.2 Comparison of dictator game and veil of ignorance treat-
ment
We now turn to hypothesis 2 and discuss whether stated preferences in front of and
behind the veil of ignorance di¤er. If they do, we might want to question the use of
peoples stated social preferences from surveys and alike as a basis for "just" policy
design. Our data would then suggest using impartially stated social preferences.
Result 2
There is a large and signicant di¤erence between social preferences and impar-
tial social preferences with risk. Subjects transfer signicantly more in the veil of
ignorance than in the dictator game treatment.
Test results in Table 7 reject hypothesis 2: medians and distributions of units
transferred di¤er signicantly for the pooled data and for men and women sepa-
rately. OLS regression results using the pooled dictator game and veil of ignorance
13Our results in the dictator game treatment are very close to those of other dictator games that
vary the price of giving. In our dictator game treatment, subjects give away 13 % of the pie on
average. With the same 50 % e¢ ciency loss and a similar pie size, they transfer 10 % in Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001) and 21 % in Andreoni and Miller (2002). In Fisman, Kariv and Markovits
(2007), for an e¢ ciency loss of 30 % or above, 60 % of subjects transfer less than 5 % of the pie,
17 % transfer 5-15 % of the pie, 10 % 15-25 % of the pie and the remaining subjects transfer more.
The corresponding gures in our dictator game treatment are very similar: 53 %, 17 % and 11 %,
respectively.
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Table 7: Test results for hypothesis 2
mean dictator mean veil of Mann-Whitney Median test*
game treatment ignorance treatment test*
all 1.61 (36 obs.) 3.48 (131 obs.) p=0.000 p=0.000
men 0.76 (17 obs.) 2.81 (91 obs.) p=0.003 p=0.018
women 2.37 (19 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.002 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
treatment data in the rst two columns of Table 8 conrm the test results: both
men and women transfer signicantly more in the veil of ignorance than in the
dictator game treatment, about 2 units on average.14 In both treatments, women
transfer signicantly more than men, a bit but not signicantly more so in the veil
of ignorance treatment.
One would have expected hypothesis 2 to be true only if (i) experimental subjects
were risk neutral and (ii) they would behave impartially even if their role is known,
i.e. if experimental subjects would not exhibit any egoism or subconscious self-
serving bias in the dictator game treatment. Thus, the next step is to gure out
where the signicant di¤erences between the dictator game treatment and the veil of
ignorance treatment stem from: Are they due to risk aversion only, the prevalence of
impartial social preferences in the veil of ignorance treatment as opposed to egoism
in the dictator game treatment, or a combination of both? In the risk treatment,
68 % of all subjects (80 % of female and 61 % of male subjects) transfer a positive
amount despite the large e¢ ciency loss occurred. The average transfer amount is
3.1 for all subjects, 3.7 for women and 2.7 for men. The majority of our subjects
clearly are risk averse.
4.3 Comparison of risk and veil of ignorance treatment
Can risk aversion account for the complete observed di¤erence in transfers between
the dictator game and the veil of ignorance treatment? Or do impartial social
14Curtis (1979) also compares individual distributional preferences in front of and behind the
veil of ignorance but adds the issue of meritocracy: subjects have to decide how to distribute 3
dollars between a high and a low scorer in a motor skill test. When subjects know whether they
are the high or the low scorer, 13 % behave consistently with maximin preferences, when they do
not know 52 % do. Hence, concerns for equality are also stronger behind than in front of the veil
of ignorance.
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Table 8: Pooled OLS
dependent variable: dictator game and veil of risk and veil of ignorance
transfer amount ignorance treatment data treatment data
explanatory variables* coe¢ cient p-value** coe¢ cient p-value**
female 1.606 0.054 1.091 0.018
VoI 2.064 0.000 -0.059 0.901
female x VoI 0.741 0.443 1.308 0.053
sequence risk - VoI -0.121 0.826 0.616 0.911
sequence VoI - risk - - -0.166 0.802
VoI x sequence VoI** - risk - - 0.343 0.651
economist 0.242 0.599 0.397 0.262
age (in years) 0.028 0.961 -0.198 0.708
age squared 0.001 0.949 0.005 0.609
constant -0.439 0.953 0.005 0.609
N 167 298
R2 0.176 0.087
*: female = 1 if female, 0 if male; VoI = 1 if veil of ignorance treatment, 0 else;
risk = 1 if risk treatment, 0 else; economist = 1 if economist, 0 else
**: based on robust standard errors
preferences additionally contribute to it?
Result 3
For female subjects impartial social preferences are a second signicant motiva-
tion behind the veil of ignorance besides risk, while this is not true for men.
Table 9: Test results for hypothesis 3
mean risk mean veil of Mann-Whitney Median test*
treatment ignorance treatment test*
all 3.07 (167 obs.) 3.48 (131 obs.) p=0.203 p=0.484
men 2.72 (108 obs.) 2.81 (91 obs.) p=0.773 p=0.980
women 3.69 (59 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.011 p=0.047
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
Table 9 compares all observations obtained in the risk and the veil of igno-
rance treatment. Analyzing only the data that are pooled for both sexes, we would
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conclude that hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected: both medians and distributions of
transfer amounts do not di¤er signicantly across the two treatments. The veil
of ignorance treatment dummy is not signicant in the right part of Table 8 that
presents OLS regression results for pooling all risk and veil of ignorance treatment
data. However, taking a closer look at the data we nd that there are striking gender
di¤erences. While hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected for men at all, it actually can be
rejected for women. For the female subjects, medians and distributions of transfer
amounts do di¤er signicantly in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. The
regression results in Table 8 document that women transfer signicantly (1.3 units)
more in the veil of ignorance treatment than in the risk treatment.
In sum, for female subjects impartial social preferences are a major motivation
behind the veil of ignorance, while this is not true for men. Impartial social prefer-
ences seem to increase equality concerns.
To check Rawlsprediction that maximin preferences prevail behind the veil of
ignorance, Table 10 categorizes the data according to "strong types", i.e. the share
of subjects who decide in favor of full e¢ ciency or full equality in each of the two
treatments.
Table 10: Strong types
risk treatment veil of ignorance treatment
participants choosing percentage number percentage number
full e¢ ciency all 32.3 % 54/167 all 27.5 % 36/131
men 38.9 % 42/108 men 35.2 % 32/91
women 20.3 % 12/59 women 10.0 % 4/40
full equality, all 4.2 % 7/167 all 13.7 % 18/131
full insurance men 3.7 % 4/108 men 8.8 % 8/91
women 5.1 % 3/59 women 25.0 % 10/40
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Result 4
In the veil of ignorance treatment, only 8.8 % of men and 25.0 % of women
act according to maximin preferences. Still, for women impartial social preferences
clearly induce a concern for equality.
We observe that nearly all subjects react to the large e¢ ciency loss in the risk
treatment: only very few subjects choose full insurance by equalizing payo¤s across
states. In the veil of ignorance treatment, the share of subjects choosing full equality
increases substantially, it doubles for men and is ve times as high for women.
Still, support for Rawls di¤erence principle is only limited: 8.8 % of men and 25.0
% of women choose full equality of payo¤s. Related experiments that elicit paid
impartial decisions behind the veil of ignorance also nd low support for maximin
preferences. In Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003) and Johansson-
Stenman, Carlsson and Daruvala (2002) only 20 % and 19 % of subjects act in a
way that is compatible with the di¤erence principle. In Frohlich, Oppenheimer and
Eavey (1987), who investigate paid group decisions, no group ever chooses an income
distribution that maximizes the lowest income. Maximizing the average income
plus a oor constraint is the most popular principle for choosing among income
distributions. In contrast, in Curtis (1979) 52 % of subjects behave according to
maximin preferences behind the veil of ignorance, in Mitchell et al. (1993) with
unpaid decisions and compulsory participation between 65 % and 83 % of subjects
(for di¤ering degrees of meritocracy) opt for the di¤erence principle.
In our experiment, a bit more than one third of men go for full e¢ ciency in both
the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. In sharp contrast, the share of women
opting for full e¢ ciency halves in the veil of ignorance treatment. Compared to
the situation in the one-person risk treatment, full e¢ ciency now implies maximal
inequality. All these ndings underline major di¤erences in the behavior of men
and women: they show that in our experiment, women exhibit impartial social
preferences for equality in a much stronger way than men.
The results presented above are conrmed by a within subject analysis where we
compare a given individuals decision in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment
(and thus skip risk treatment data from the dictator game treatment - risk treatment
sequence). Applying a Wilcoxon signed rank test to the pooled within subject data
(131 observations) yields p=0.037 (two-sided), i.e. distributions of transfer amounts
di¤er signicantly in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. This result is
purely caused by the behavior of female subjects. A two-sided Wilcoxon signed
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rank test reveals that female subjects transfer signicantly di¤erent amounts in the
risk and veil of ignorance treatment (p=0.006) while men do not (p=0.790).
Table 11 classies subjects according to three "weak types", namely whether an
individual does not react at all to the existence of the second person in the veil of
ignorance treatment, whether it opts for more equality or for more e¢ ciency as soon
as the second person shows up.
Table 11: Within subject analysis
subjects who transfer ... all men women
the same amount in the risk 44 % 53 % 22.5 %
and the veil of ignorance treatment
more in the veil of ignorance 35 % 24 % 60 %
treatment
less in the veil of ignorance 21 % 23 % 17.5 %
treatment
number of observations 131 91 40
For more than half of the male subjects the existence of the second person does
not add impartial social preferences as a motive, while this is only true for less than
1/4 of female subjects.15 For those male subjects for whom impartial social prefer-
ences matter their e¤ect is equally likely to point in the direction of an increased
e¢ ciency or an equality motive. 60 % of women transfer more in the veil of igno-
rance treatment than in the risk treatment (3.1 units on average), but only about
1/4 of men do (4.0 units on average). These ndings conrm that for the vast ma-
jority of female subjects the veil of ignorance induces impartial social preferences for
equality besides inducing risk. Our results for those 14 out of 131 subjects (7 men
and 7 women) who do not opt for full insurance in the risk treatment, but choose
full equality in the veil of ignorance treatment imply that the di¤erence principle
can be derived from impartial social preferences for equality and does not require
that subjects are innitely risk averse. Impartial social preferences for equality are
even a more prominent motive for choosing the maximin allocation in the veil of
15Subjects who transfer the same amount in both treatments could also have a degree of risk
aversion and impartial social preferences that imply the same transfer amount in the veil of igno-
rance treatment. While we cannot totally disapprove this possibility, we can be sure that these
subjectsdecisions are, on average, not driven by strong equality concerns: they transfer only 2.2
out of 8 reasonably possible units in the veil of ignorance treatment.
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ignorance treatment. Only 3 subjects act according to maximin preferences in the
veil of ignorance treatment because they are extremely risk averse, i.e. transfer 8
units in both the veil of ignorance and the risk treatment. These results contrast the
utilitariansclaim that maximin preferences necessarily represent preferences with
innite risk aversion. We should keep in mind, however, that overall support for the
di¤erence principle is only limited.
While our results for women demonstrate that impartial social preferences for
equality are one important motive behind the veil of ignorance there are also subjects
- 23 % of men and 17.5 % of women - with impartial social preferences for e¢ ciency.16
Insofar our results are related to those of Engelmann and Strobels (2004) taxation
games that document that both concerns for e¢ ciency and maximin preferences are
important motives for impartial decision makers.
5 Conclusion
Rawls claim that a truly just allocation of resources can only be based on im-
partial judgments made behind the veil of ignorance is as intuitively attractive as
disputable: democratic institutions rest upon the assumption that competition of
vested interests is able to balance interests appropriately. It was not the aim of this
paper to comment on this. Our experimental results simply show that preferences
stated in front of and behind the veil of ignorance di¤er signicantly. Behind the
veil of ignorance, subjects prefer more equal distributions, but only a minority of
subjects acts according to maximin preferences. Consequently, support for Rawls
di¤erence principle is far from being unanimous. On a technical level, we have
presented an experimental design that separates the e¤ects of risk and impartial
social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. We have found that men prefer more
16In our data, subjects who transfer less in the veil of ignorance treatment than in the risk
treatment are substantially more risk averse than those who transfer more. A possible explanation
for why subjects transfer less could be that subjects maximize the sum of their own and the second
persons expected utility but do not have any distributional concerns. Subjects would then give
away less (more) in the veil of ignorance treatment if they perceive themselves as more (less) risk
averse than the average participant. In the nal questionnaire we asked our subjects to assess
whether they had transferred more or less than the average participant in the risk treatment.
We run an OLS regression to explain the di¤erence in transferred units in the veil of ignorance
and the risk treatment. Controlling for subject characteristics, the individual perception of own
risk aversion compared to average risk aversion is not signicant. Consequently, our data reect
distributional concerns.
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equal distributions mostly for insurance purposes. In contrast, womens choice of
more equal allocations is also due impartial social preferences that value equality
per se. Most importantly, our results for those subjects who act according to max-
imin preferences in the veil of ignorance, but not in the risk treatment challenge the
utilitariansclaim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily
represent preferences with innite risk aversion.
Our results also contribute to the growing literature on gender di¤erences in
economic behavior. Gender e¤ects in our data are strong. They imply that women
are more risk averse than men. Furthermore, when there is a trade o¤ between
equality and e¢ ciency women seem to have stronger preferences for equal allocations
while men have stronger preferences for e¢ cient allocations.
6 Appendix
6.1 Instructions and control questions
Both instructions and control questions were originally in German. The translated
instructions and control questions presented below are those of the veil of ignorance
treatment. The instructions and control questions for the dictator game and the risk
treatment are structured and phrased in the same way with just one exception: to
explain the risk treatment in the most natural and easiest possible way the instruc-
tions did not mention the state of being participant A (dictator) or B (receiver), but
described the two possible states by throwing a dice and getting either an even or
an odd number. The instructions of the dictator game and the risk treatment are
available from the author upon request.
6.1.1 Instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this economic experiment.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you will be able to earn an amount of
money that depends on your own decisions. Therefore, it is very important that you
read these explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate
to ask us. Please raise your hand, and we will come to your seat.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other partic-
ipants, to use cell phones or to start any programs on the computer.
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The neglect of these rules will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all
payments.
During the experiment we talk about points instead of Euros. Your total income
will therefore be calculated in points rst. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points obtained during the experiment will be converted in Euros at an
exchange rate of
1 point = 1 Euro.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earned income that is the result
of your decision in cash.
On the next pages we will explain the exact course of the experiment.
The Experiment
In this experiment there are two participants, A and B.
Participant A has an initial endowment of 12 points, whereas participant B has
an initial endowment of 0 points. Participant A can transfer every integer amount
between 0 and 12 points (0 and 12 included) to participant B. Every transfer leads
to the loss of half of the transferred points. This means that participant B
receives only half of a point for every full point participant A transfers
to him. Participant B does not have any inuence on the decision of participant A
and the course of the game apart from being paid half of the points transferred to
him by participant A at the end of the experiment. Participant A will be paid the
amount of points that he does not transfer.
The following table shows all possible distributions of points for participant A and
B at the end of the experiment:
A transfers to B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
As points 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Bs points 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
The course of the experiment is the following:
Stage 1:
First, you have to decide how many points participant A transfers to participant
B. This can be done by entering the number of points that are transferred from
participant A to participant B on the following screen and pushing the OK-Button
afterwards. Note that at this stage you do not know yet whether you will
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be a participant A or a participant B in stage 2. The computer has already
randomly chosen another participant with whom you form a pair.
[screen]
Stage 2:
A random selection determines whether you are assigned the role of participant A
or the one of participant B. When you are assigned the role of participant A, the
participant assigned to you has the role of participant B. When you are assigned
the role of participant B, the participant assigned to you has the role of participant
A. Every pair therefore consists of one real participant A and one real
participant B. Both during the experiment and afterwards neither you nor the
participant assigned to you know who the respective partner is.
Stage 3:
Your decision in stage 1 will be realized in any case, independent from
whether you are assigned to the role of participant A or B. (This is possible
because only half of the participants present in this room are taking part in the
same experiment as you do. The other half of the participants is playing another
experiment whose payo¤ does not a¤ect you at all. You are assigned a participant
from this other half.)
Example 1: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains 5:2=2.5
points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing lots that
you are participant B. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 2.5 points. The
participant assigned to you obtains 7 points.
Example 2: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains 5:2=2.5
points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing lots that
you are participant A. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 7 points. The
participant assigned to you obtains 2.5 points.
This experiment is played only once. At the end of the experiment all participants
A and B are paid their income in cash.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to
answer your question.
6.1.2 Control questions
Question 1: You decide that A transfers 3 points to B. It is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant A.
How many points does B get?
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How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant B be paid?
Question 2: You decide that A transfers 6 points to B. It is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant B.
How many points does B get?
How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant A be paid?
6.2 Data by treatment and sex
Figure 1: Transferred amount in the dictator game treatment by sex
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Figure 2: Transferred amount in the risk treatment by sex
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Figure 3: Transferred amount in the veil of ignorance treatment by sex
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